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Abstract
The secrecy capacity achieving problem of the wiretap channel against an active eavesdropper with
unlimited computational power over is an important foresighted task for secure communication. For
active wiretap channel, the effectiveness of cryptography embedded secure coding schemes are limited
due to the passive problem of physical layer coding. Thus in this paper, a novel solution called active
secure coding scheme is proposed which combines physical secure coding with machine learning to
implement an active defense against the active eavesdropper.
To construct an universal active method for secure coding, an abstract active wiretap channel model
is constructed under the detectable precondition, in which hidden Markov model is employed to build
the internal eavesdropper behavior pattern (the stochastic process for eavesdropper behavior states) with
stochastically mapped external observations. Based on the abstract model, an eavesdropper behavior
pattern learning and eavesdropper behavior states decoding are constructed for estimating the optimal
eavesdropper behavior states, which enables the secure coding scheme to respond the eavesdropper
actively. Then this active secure coding method is performed to the general varying wiretap channel to
construct an explicit active secure polar coding scheme. As proofed, the proposed active secure polar
coding scheme can theoretically achieve the average secrecy capacity of t times secure transmissions
under the reliability and strong security criterions.
Index Terms
active wiretap channel, active secure coding scheme, eavesdropper behavior learning, polar code,
hidden Markov model.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of quantum computing technology, rapidly growing computation power
has already threatened the security of computing complexity based cryptography [1], [2]. Thus,
in near future, when eavesdropper obtains extremely high level of computational power, issue of
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2confidential communication without cryptographic schemes will be an important and practical
problem. One decent solution for this foresighted problem is physical layer secure coding
which was proposed by Wyner in 1975 with his Wiretap Channel (WTC) model [3]. Because
of its information-theoretic security, secure coding scheme can provide secure and reliable
communication without encryption.
In the last decade, polar code [4] based secure coding schemes had achieved secrecy capacities
of Wyner’s WTC [5], [6] and several other extended WTC models [7]–[10] under the security
and reliability criterions. But these secure coding schemes are all designed under a setting
that eavesdropper can only passively wiretapping without any initiative changes, generalized as
Passive Wiretap Channel (P-WTC), which is however too idealized.
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Fig. 1. Active Wiretap Channel. Symbols and encoding/decoding processes are not shown.
On the contrary, for more practical category of WTC, the Active Wiretap Channel (A-WTC),
physical layer secure coding schemes are however no longer effective. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
in A-WTC whole WTC is under the control of an active eavesdropper with various wiretapping
measures, such as selectively reading (WTC-II [11]), selectively writing (Adversarial WTC [12]),
channel status changing (Arbitrary Varying WTC [13]), while in many cases, channels and
wiretapping status are unknown to the legitimate users [14]. Since physical layer coding can
only be constructed on a fixed status of channels and defense passively, it is hard for the passive
secure coding scheme to cover the constantly changed active eavesdropping in A-WTC.
One commonly adapted modification method for A-WTC secure scheme construction is the
combination of cryptography and physical layer secure coding [12], [15], [16] which is unfortu-
nately unapplicable to the unlimited computational condition. Besides, even though cryptography
can add adaptability to the secure scheme to some extents, the essentially passive problem of
physical layer coding remains unsolved. Thus, when the range of active-eavesdropping behavior
is expanded or the type of eavesdropping behavior is changed, the effectiveness of encrypted
3secure coding schemes will be vanished.
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Fig. 2. The idea of active secure coding scheme.
In the aim of constructing an efficient secure coding scheme for A-WTC, the essentially
passive problem must be solved. Thus, in this paper, we present a novel idea called active
secure coding scheme. As illustrated in Fig. 2, instead of passively defense with a fix secure
coding, active secure coding scheme is designed to respond to the active changes of wiretap
behavior and adjust the secure coding actively. The core issue of designing an active secure
coding scheme is how to respond the active changes of A-WTC correctly.
In 2007, A middle ground detectable precondition was presented in [17] when constructing
an A-WTC encrypted secure coding scheme, which is also precisely useful to our active secure
coding issue.
Definition 1 (Detectable precondition [17]) In A-WTC active modification of eavesdropper may
induce some physical effects in the environment that can be detected by legitimate parties.
Based on the detectable precondition, the general idea of our active secure coding scheme is
as follow:
i. Learn the active eavesdropper behavior pattern of eavesdropper from the observed informa-
tion;
ii. Decode or predict the eavesdropper behavior state from the observed information according
to the learned behavior pattern;
iii. Construct or modify the optimal physical layer coding scheme corresponding to the decoded
eavesdropper behavior state.
Thus, in this paper, we construct an active secure coding scheme as a novel solution for the
foresighted problem of confidential communication over A-WTC with unlimited computation
power. Specifically, under the detectable precondition, we use models and algorithms of machine
4learning to construct the eavesdropper behavior pattern learning and state decoding, which is
positively related to the unlimited computation power; we use polar code to construct the secure
coding.
The outline of this paper is as follow. Section II presents the notations and construct a abstract
model of detectable A-WTC. Section III presents the construction of the machine learning based
universal active secure coding scheme for abstract detectable A-WTC. Section IV presents the
construction of active secure polar coding scheme for general varying WTC. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. ABSTRACT MODEL OF DETECTABLE A-WTC
Notation: We define the integer interval [[a, b]] as the integer set between bac and dbe. For
n ∈ N, define N , 2n. Denote X , Y , Z,... random variables (RVs) taking values in alphabets
X , Y , Z ,... and the sample values of these RVs are denoted by x, y, z,... respectively. Then
pXY denotes the joint probability of X and Y , and pX , pY denotes the marginal probabilities.
Also we denote a N size vector XN , (X1, X2, ..., XN), denote Xba , (Xa, Xa+1, ..., Xb). And
for any index set A j [[1, N ]], we define XA , {Xi}i∈A. For the polar codes, we denote GN
the generator matrix , R the bit reverse matrix, F =
[
1 0
1 1
]
, ⊗ the Kronecker product, and have
GN = RF⊗n.
In order to design an universal active secure coding scheme, first we have to construct an
abstract A-WTC model with the detectable precondition. Thus in this section, we present a new
construction method for abstract A-WTC model, as the state based A-WTC. In the abstract
model, active behavior of eavesdropper is described by the abstract behavior state without any
details. Considering the following definitions.
Definition 2 (Eavesdropper behavior state, EB state) Denote S the abstract expression of EB
state with alphabet S = {s1, s2, s3, ...}, and the state value of s abstractly represents the
main channel condition and wiretapping approaches. e.g., for original WTC, S = {s1}, s1 =
(pX|Y , pX|Z). For A-WTC, time sequence s1, s2, s3, ... represents the actively changing of the EB,
and the internal relation between each states is denoted as the EB pattern.
5Definition 3 (Observed information) Denote O the observed information detected by the legiti-
mate users, with alphabet O = {o1,o2,o3, ...}. The observed value o is related to the value of
EB state s.
EB state
(main channel condition & 
wiretapping approaches）
Alice Bob
Eve
Encoding DecodingM
NX NY Mˆ
NZ
{ 1, 2, 3,...}  s s s
S
O
Fig. 3. EB state based abstract detectable A-WTC.
With the EB state S and observed information O, the discrete memoryless abstract detectable
A-WTC is construct as (X ,Y ,Z,S,O) with two legitimate users Alice and Bob and an active
eavesdropper Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
• Eve: actively choose the EB state S ∈ S which contains the main channel condition as
pX|Y and the wiretapping approaches. Obtains ZN from the channel according to S.
• Alice: encode M into XN and transmit to Bob over the EB state S. Receive the observed
information O when EB state is changing.
• Bob: receive Y N from Alice over the EB state S and decodes it into estimated Mˆ .
Definition 4 For abstract detectable A-WTC with EB state si, the secrecy capacity is charac-
terized as
Cs(si) = max
M→U→X→Y,Z
[I (U ;Y |si)− I (U ;Z|si)] (1)
For the construction of abstract detectable A-WTC, the only restricted assumption is
∀si ∈ S, Cs(si) > 0 (2)
which guarantees the implementation of the physical layer secure coding. For every state value
si ∈ S, define a correspondent N length code as follow.
Definition 5 Denote a (2NR, N) code ci for the state value si ∈ S, with messages M ∈ M =
[[1, 2NR]] and random source R with arbitrary distribution. Then have
6• the encoding function:
F(si) :M×R→ XN (3)
• the decoding function with error bits “?”
G(si) : YN →M× {?} (4)
The performance of a code ci is defined as
• error probability:
Pe(si, ci) = Pr(M 6= Mˆ |si, ci) (5)
• information leakage to Eve:
L(si, ci) = I(ZN ;M |si, ci) (6)
Definition 6 For state si, rate R is achievable if sequence of code ci exists under any of the
criterions listed below:
• reliability criterion:
lim
N→∞
Pe(si, ci) = 0 (7)
• weak security criterion:
lim
N→∞
1
N
L(si, ci) = 0 (8)
• strong security criterion:
lim
N→∞
L(si, ci) = 0 (9)
Remark 1 Reliability and security criterions are measures for evaluating the performance of a
code ci. Reliability can be achieved with a vanishing error probability of decoding the messages.
Weak security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage rate. And strong security
can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage.
III. UNIVERSAL ACTIVE SECURE CODING SCHEME
In this section, we construct an universal active secure coding scheme on the EB state based
abstract detected A-WTC, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Our construction of universal active secure coding scheme contains four procedures:
i. Establish a stochastic model for the EB state S as the EB pattern, with relationship to the
internal observed information O;
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Fig. 4. Structure of universal active secure coding scheme
ii. Construct a learning process of the EB pattern from the observed information O by using
machine learning algorithms;
iii. Construct a decoding process of the EB state S from the observed information O with
learned EB pattern by using machine learning algorithms;
iv. Design a modification method for secure coding based on the decoded EB state S.
A. Model Construction for EB Pattern and Observed Information
Make the following assumptions.
• Assume that the active EB pattern is a stochastic process that can be expressed by stochastic
models;
• Assume that legitimate users know S and O;
• Assume that the correspondence between EB state value and observation value is not one
to one, otherwise EB state can be directly identified from the observed information.
Based on the assumptions above, we build the EB pattern and observation by using Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) [18]. As illustrated in Fig 5, the basic HMM contains two parts, a hidden
internal part which is a Markov process of hidden states, and an external observation part for
observing the emission information with probability correlation to the current hidden state. The
structure of HMM can nicely match our state based detectable A-WTC model.
Active model construction:
Consider an HMM (S,O,A,B, pi) with parameter set λ = (A,B, pi). The corresponding
relations between the detectable A-WTC and HMM are as follow.
• Alphabet S = {s1, s2, s3, ...} of the EB state equals to the state set S of HMM, denote
|S| = α;
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Fig. 5. The basic Hidden Markov Model. 1-HMM with state set S = {s1, s2, s3} and observation set O = {o1,o2,o3,o4},
aij is the transparent probability from state si to sj, bi is the 1× |O| emission probability matrix from state si to O.
• Alphabet O = {o1,o2,o3, ...} of the detected information equals to the observation set O
of HMM, denote |O| = γ;
• Matrix A is a α× α state transparent probability matrix of the internal Markov process of
HMM, for i ∈ [[1, α]] have
A = (aij)α×α, aij = p(sj|si) (10)
• Matrix B is a α × γ emission probability matrix of HMM from S to O, for i ∈ [[1, α]],
j ∈ [[1, γ]] have
B = (bij)α×γ, bij = p(oj|si) (11)
• pi is a 1× α probability matrix for the initial state S1 when t = 1, have
pi = [ p(S1 = s1), p(S1 = s2), p(S1 = s3), ... ]1×α (12)
Generally, denote M the internal Markov process of HMM. For t = 1, define S1 = M(pi); for
t > 1,
St = M(St−11 ,A)
(a)
= M(St−1,A), S ∈ S (13)
where (a) is for the first-order Markov model (1-HMM) case. Denote E the external emission
process, then have
Ot = E(St,B), O ∈ O, S ∈ S (14)
Remark 2 In the proposed model construction with 1-HMM, the EB pattern is described by a
first-order Markov model which is a basic stochastic model. In case for more practical needs,
9high-order Markov model or other better stochastic models can be applied to enhance the
model accuracy but will also increase the calculating complexity. As in 1-HMM, we simply use
the emission probability to establish the correlation between EB state and detected information.
In more complex cases, connections between each observations can be modified.
Theorem 1 (Squared prediction error [23], [24]) Let V be the variable that we trying to predict,
and Q be the covariates. Assume a relationship as
V = f(Q) +  (15)
where  is the error term that normally distributed with a mean of zero, e.g.  ∼ N (0, σ). Then
for an estimate model fˆ(Q) of f(Q), the expected squared prediction error at point q is
Err(q) = E
[
(V − fˆ(q)2)
]
(16)
and can be decomposed into bias and variance components as
Err(q) =
(
E[fˆ(q)− f(q)]
)2
+ E
[(
fˆ(q)− E[fˆ(q)]
)2]
+ σ2 (17)
in the form of
Err(q) = Bias2 + Variance + Irreducible Error (18)
where the irreducible error is the noise term in the true relationship. In practical cases with
imperfect model and finite data, there is a tradeoff between minimizing the bias and minimizing
the variance. Considering a theoretically case with vanished noise, true model and infinite data
for calibration, both the bias and variance terms can be reduced to 0.
B. EB Pattern Learning
To construct the active secure coding scheme, firstly we implement the learning procedure of
the EB pattern from the observed information. Considering the HMM based model construction
for detectable A-WTC, the issue of EB pattern learning can be turned into the learning of the
HMM parameter set λ = (A,B, pi) from the observation time sequence Ot1 which is the training
data.
EB pattern learning: considering t-times transmissions, with parameter set λ for the stochastic
model of EB pattern and observation, EB state S ∈ S and observation sequence Ot1, O ∈ O,
the EB pattern learning process L is to learn the optimal estimated λˆ from training data Ot1, as
λˆ = L(Ot1,S,O) (19)
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have for t→∞, ∀ 1, 0 < 1 < 1, ∃ L, that
Pe(L) = Pr(λˆ 6= λ|L) < 1 (20)
Thus for the HMM (S,O,A,B, pi), the learning process is
(Aˆ, Bˆ, pˆi) = L(Ot1,S,O) (21)
To learn the optimal estimated parameter set of HMM, we can apply the Baum-Welch algorithm
[18], as in Appendix A.
C. EB state Decoding
Based on the learned EB pattern and the observation correlation, specifically the optimal
estimated parameter set λˆ, we can decoding the observation Ot1 to obtain the estimated EB state
time sequence Sˆt1.
EB state decoding: considering t-times transmissions, with parameter set λ for the stochastic
model of EB pattern and observation, EB state S ∈ S and observation sequence Ot1, O ∈ O, the
EB state decoding process D is the process to decode the optimal estimated Sˆt1 from training
data Ot1, as
Sˆt1 = D(Ot1, λˆ,S,O) (22)
have for t→∞, ∀ 2, 0 < 2 < 1, ∃ D, that
Pe(D) = Pr(Sˆt1 6= St1|D) < 2 (23)
Thus for the HMM (S,O,A,B, pi), the decoding process is
Sˆt1 = D(Ot1, Aˆ, Bˆ, pˆi,S,O) (24)
To decode the optimal estimated EB state sequence of HMM, we can apply the Viterbi algorithm
[19], as in Appendix B.
D. Modification Method for Secure Coding
Considering two different cases for the detectable A-WTC,
• Non-delay A-WTC: in this case, the actively changing of EB states is ahead of the encoding
process. Thus before secure encoding process of t-th time transmission, legitimate users
can observe Ot1 and directly decoding the estimated Sˆ
t
1 for t-th communication.
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• Delay A-WTC: in this case, the actively changing of EB states is after the encoding process.
For t-th time transmission, legitimate users can only observe Ot−11 and decoding S
t−1
1 before
the secure coding process, thus there is an additional time series prediction problem for Sˆt.
In this paper, we study the non-delay case, and leave the delay case for future researches.
Optional secure coding: For each EB state value si ∈ S, assume a corespondent physical layer
secure coding ci as defined in Definition 5, and obtain the secure coding set C = {c1, c2, ..., cα}
which satisfies both reliability (7) and strong security criterion (9). Therefore for the abstract
detectable A-WTC, after obtaining Sˆt ∈ S from the observation Ot1 by EB pattern learning and
states decoding, one can directly choose secure code Cˆt ∈ {c1, c2, ..., cα} that corresponds to
Sˆt.
In order to learn a relatively stable initial EB pattern for decoding the EB state and maintaining
security at the beginning of the secure communication, we installing a pre-learning stage for
initial training data collection.
Pre-learning stage: Setting a ω rounds transmissions prior to the secure communication as
the pre-learning stage, in which legitimate users only transmit uncoded random bits. So that
legitimate parties can collect enough observations from the changing of EB states without any
information leakage. Observations of pre-learning stage are defined as Oω.
E. Performance Analyses
Definition 7 Denote symbol ∨ as match and symbol ∧ as unmatch. e.g. for S = {s1, s2, ..., sα}
and C = {c1, c2, ..., cα}, have si ∨ cj if i = j, si ∧ cj if i 6= j.
Thus for i-th time secure transmission, i ∈ [[1, t]], when N →∞, assume
• secrecy rate
Rs(Si, Cˆi) ≤ Cs(Si), if si ∨ cˆi
Rs(Si, Cˆi) = 0, if si ∧ cˆi
(26)
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• error probability
Pe(Si, Cˆi) = Pr(M 6= Mˆ |Si, Cˆi)
=
0, if si ∨ cˆi1, if si ∧ cˆi
(28)
• information leakage
L(Si, Cˆi) = I(M ;Z
N |Si, Cˆi)
=
0, if si ∨ cˆi1, if si ∧ cˆi
(30)
For each time of secure transmission, if Cˆi matches EB state Si, then transmission achieves
security and reliability; if Cˆi does not match EB state Si, we assume that neither security nor
reliability is achieved. Based on these setting, we analyze the average performance of t times
independent secure communications.
Definition 8 Separate [[1, t]] into two sets t(∨) and t(∧), where t(∨) is the numbers of times
that Cˆi matches Si, with set length t∨, and t(∧) is the numbers of times that Cˆi dose not match
Si, with set length t∧. From (23), for (t+ ω)→∞, have t∨/t = 1− 2 and t∧/t = 2.
Proposition 1 (Secrecy rate, reliability and security) For the abstract detectable A-WTC, the
proposed universal active secure coding scheme can achieve the average secrecy capacity of t
time secure communication under the reliability and strong security criterions, when N → ∞
and (t+ ω)→∞.
Proof: Denote R¯s the average secrecy rate for t times secure transmission with N → ∞,
have
R¯s =
1
t
t∑
i=1
Rs(Si, Cˆi)
=
1
t
[
∑
t(∨)
Rs(Si ∨ Cˆi) +
∑
t(∧)
Rs(Sj ∧ Cˆj)]
=
1
t
∑
t(∨)
Rs(Si ∨ Cˆi)
≤ 1
t
∑
t(∨)
Cs(Si)
(b)
≤ C¯s
(32)
13
where C¯s is the average secrecy capacity of t times secure transmission, and the equal holds
for (b) when (t+ ω)→∞ that 2 is vanished.
Denote Pe the error probability for t times secure transmission, have
Pe = Pr(M
t
1 6= Mˆ t1) =
∑
t(∧) |Mj|∑t
i=1 |Mi|
(33)
For N →∞, assume |Mi| of each time are the same, then have
Pe =
t∧
t
= 2 (34)
Thus Pe is vanished for (t+ ω)→∞.
Denote L the information leakage (strong security) for t times secure transmission, have
L = I[M t1; (Z
N)t1]
(c)
=
t∑
i=1
I[Mi; (Z
N)i]
=
∑
t(∨)
I[Mi; (Z
N)i|Si ∨ Cˆi] +
∑
t(∧)
I[Mj; (Z
N)j|Sj ∧ Cˆj]
=t∧ = 2t
(36)
where (c) is because transmissions of each times are independent. Thus L is vanished for
(t+ ω)→∞ and N →∞.
IV. ACTIVE SECURE POLAR CODING SCHEME FOR GENERAL VARYING WTC
In this section, we perform our universal active secure coding to a specific A-WTC, the
General Varying WTC (GV-WTC), and construct an explicit active secure polar coding scheme.
A. The General Varying WTC
Varying Wiretap Channel, with another name Compound Wiretap Channel in [14], is an
A-WTC that the actual channel realization is controlled and shifted by the eavesdropper and
unknown to the legitimate users, as illustrated in Fig. 6. In the model, the channel realization
remains constant during the N length codeword transmission at each rounds, and legitimate
parties knows the entire set of possible channel realizations. In this paper, we discuss the general
case of Varying WTC in which both main channel and wiretap channel are asymmetric with no
degraded relations.
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Fig. 6. The General Varying WTC with observation.
Definition 9 The HMM based discrete memoryless General Varying Wiretap Channel with obser-
vation is defined as (X ,Y ,Z,S,O,A,B, pi), where S = {s1, s2, ..., sα}, O = {o1,o2, ...,oγ},
λ = (A,B, pi). For si ∈ S, si = p(i)Y Z|X which have:
∀ (xN , yN , zN) ∈ XN × YN ×ZN ,
pY NZN |XN
(
yN , zN |xN) = N∏
j=1
p
(i)
Y Z|X (yj, zj|xj)
(38)
For HMM based EB pattern and observation, O ∈ O, S ∈ S, have
• EB pattern:
S1 = M(pi), St = M(St−11 ,A) (39)
• observation:
Ot = E(St,B) (40)
For every EB states of GV-WTC, the secrecy capacity Cs(si) is the same as Definition 1, the
reliability and security criterions are the same as Definition 6.
Theorem 2 [14] For the GV-WTC, under the strong security criterion, the universal secrecy
capacity Cus with S is bounded by
Cus(S) ≥ max
M→U→X→Y,Z
[
min
S
I(U ;Y )−max
S
I(U ;Z)
]
Cus(S) ≤ minS maxM→U→X→Y,Z [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]
= min
S
Cs(si)
(42)
B. Active Secure Polar Coding Scheme
To construct the active secure coding scheme, first we need to build a correspondent secure
polar coding for each EB state si ∈ S.
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Definition 10 (Bhattaharyya parameter) Consider a pair of random variables (X, Y ) with joint
distribution pX|Y , where X is a binary random variable and Y is a finite-alphabet random
variable. To measure the amount of randomness in X given Y , the Bhattaharyya parameter is
defined as
Z(X|Y ) = 2
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)
√
pX|Y (0|y)pX|Y (1|y) (43)
Polar subset division for si:
Consider si = p(i)Y Z|X , i ∈ [[1, α]], β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−N
β , assume knowing the optimal
distribution of channel inputs to achieve the channel capacity under p(i)Y |X , then have
• source polarization
H(i)X =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U j−11 ) ≥ 1− δN}
L(i)X =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U j−11 ) ≤ δN} (45)
• main channel polarization
H(i)X|Y =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U j−11 , Y N) ≥ 1− δN}
L(i)X|Y =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U j−11 , Y N) ≤ δN} (47)
• wiretap channel polarization
H(i)X|Z =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U j−11 , ZN) ≥ 1− δN}
L(i)X|Z =
{
j ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Uj|U j−11 , ZN) ≤ δN} (49)
• subset divisions of index N
I(i) = H(i)X ∩ L(i)X|Y ∩H(i)X|Z
F (i) = H(i)X ∩
(
L(i)X|Y
)c
∩H(i)X|Z
R(i) = H(i)X ∩ L(i)X|Y ∩
(
H(i)X|Z
)c
B(i) = H(i)X ∩
(
L(i)X|Y
)c
∩
(
H(i)X|Z
)c
D(i) =
(
H(i)X
)c
(51)
assume |I(i)| > max
S
|B|, then construct a subset E (i) that satisfies
E (i) ⊂ I(i), |E (i)| = max
S
|B| (52)
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Remark 3 For each si = p(i)Y Z|X , subset I(i)\E (i) is secure and reliable, which is for information
bits; subset E (i), with a fixed size for all si, is secure and reliable, which is for functional random
bits; subset F (i) is secure but unreliable, which is for frozen bits; subset R(i) is reliable but
insecure, which is for uniformly distributed random bits; subset B(i) is neither secure nor reliable,
thus which is constructed to retransmit the random bits in E (i) of last round; subset D(i) is for
deterministic bits calculated by
uj = arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |Uj−11 (u|u
j−1
1 ), j ∈ D(i) (53)
Now we introduce the structure of our active secure polar coding scheme for GV-WTC.
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Fig. 7. The structure of active secure polar coding scheme.
Active secure polar coding scheme:
The secure coding structure of t time secure communications is illustrated in Fig. 7, which is a
modified and extended multi-block chaining structure. For non-delay GV-WTC (X ,Y ,Z,S,O, λ)
and confidential message M ∈ M, assuming legitimate parties know the full set of S,O, then
the active secure polar coding scheme is as follow.
i. Pre-learning stage: same as the secure structure for abstract A-WTC, we set a pre-learning
stage with ω rounds random transmission before the t times secure communications, with
observations as oω.
ii. EB pattern learning: for i-th time secure communication, i ∈ [[1, t]], with observations as
oi1, the learning process is
λˆi = L(oω, oi1,S,O) (54)
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iii. EB state decoding: for i-th time, with λˆi, decoding the optimal estimated state sequence sˆi1
by
sˆi1 = D(oω, ot1, λˆi,S,O) (55)
iv. Subsets division: for i-th time, based on the optimal estimated EB state sˆi, perform the
polar subsets division of index N , and obtain (Iˆi, Fˆi, Rˆi, Bˆi, Dˆi, Eˆi).
v. Encoding: for i-th time, make the following assignment to uN :
– uIˆi\Eˆi: assigned with information bits of Mi;
– uFˆi: assigned with frozen bits;
– uRˆi: assigned with uniformly distributed random bits;
– uEˆi: assigned with uniformly distributed random bits;
– uDˆi: assigned with deterministic bits calculated by (53);
– uBˆi: if i = 1, assigned with a pre-shared random bits; if i > 1, assigned with the first
|Bˆi| bits of uEˆi−1 in time i− 1.
Then encode uN into the optimally distributed channel input xN by polar encoding xN =
uNGN , and transmit xN over the channel.
vi. Decoding: for i-th time, legitimate user Bob receives yN and decodes it into the estimated
uˆN by using the succussive cancelation decoding [4].
– for j ∈ Iˆi ∪ Rˆi,
uˆj = arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |Uj−11 Y N
(
u|uˆj−11 yN
)
(56)
– for j ∈ Fˆi, uˆj is directly decoded as the frozen bits;
– for j ∈ Bˆi, if i = 1, uˆj is directly decoded as the pre-shared bits, if i > 1, uˆj is directly
decoded as the correspondent bit of uˆEˆi−1 in time i− 1;
– for i ∈ Dˆi,
uˆj = arg max
u∈{0,1}
pUj |Uj−11
(
u|uˆj−11
)
(57)
C. Performance Analyses
Definition 11 For i-th secure transmission with i ∈ [[1, t]], consider a polar subsets division of
index N based on the real EB states si, have (Ii,Fi,Ri,Bi,Di, Ei).
For i ∈ t(∨), have
(Iˆi, Fˆi, Rˆi, Bˆi, Dˆi, Eˆi) = (Ii,Fi,Ri,Bi,Di, Ei) (58)
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For i ∈ t(∧), have
(Iˆi, Fˆi, Rˆi, Bˆi, Dˆi, Eˆi) 6= (Ii,Fi,Ri,Bi,Di, Ei) (59)
Then define the following subsets for i ∈ t(∧) cases.
• ξi = (Iˆi \ Eˆi) ∩ Ii, the set that remains secure and reliable for message bits;
• ξ′i = Iˆi ∩ (Ii ∪ Fi), the set that remains secure for Iˆi;
• ξ˜i = Iˆi ∩ (Bi ∪Ri, the set that is mistaken as secure for Iˆi ;
• ηi = (Iˆi ∪ Rˆi) ∩ (Ii ∪Ri), the set that remains reliable;
• η′i = Eˆi ∩ (Ii ∪Ri), the set that remains reliable for Eˆi;
• η˜i = (Iˆi ∪ Rˆi) ∩ (Bi ∪ Fi), the set that is mistaken as reliable;
• η˜′i = Eˆi ∩ (Bi ∪ Fi), the set that is mistaken as reliable for Eˆi.
Lemma 1 ( [20], [21]) Considering the polarization of the asymmetric discrete memoryless
wiretap channel, for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ , have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|HX | = H(X)
lim
N→∞
1
N
|LX | = 1−H(X)
lim
N→∞
1
N
|HX|Y | = H(X|Y )
lim
N→∞
1
N
|LX|Y | = 1−H(X|Y )
(61)
Thus, have
lim
N→∞
1
N
|HX ∩ LX|Y | = I(X;Y )
lim
N→∞
1
N
|HX ∩ (HX|Z)c| = I(X;Z)
(63)
Proposition 2 (Achievable secrecy rate) Let Rs(t) be the secrecy rate of t time secure trans-
mission for our proposed active secure polar coding scheme, when (ω + t) → ∞, the upper
bound Rs(t) achieves is greater than the upper bound of Cus under the reliability and strong
security criterion for GV-WTC.
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Proof:
Rs(t) =
1
Nt
(
∑
t(∨)
|Iˆi \ Eˆi|+
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|)
=
1
Nt
∑
t(∨)
(|Iˆi| − |Bˆmax|) + 1
Nt
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
≤ 1
Nt
∑
t(∨)
(|Iˆi| − |Bˆi|) + 1
Nt
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
=
1
Nt
∑
t(∨)
[
(|Iˆi|+ |Rˆi|)− (|Bˆi|+ |Rˆi|)
]
+
1
Nt
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
=
1
t
∑
t(∨)
|H(i)X ∩ L(i)X|Y | − |H(i)X ∩ (H(i)X|Z)c|
N
+
1
Nt
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
(d)
=
1
t
∑
t(∨)
[I(U ;Y |cˆi ∨ si)− I(U ;Z|cˆi ∨ si)] + 1
Nt
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
=
1
t
∑
t(∨)
Cs(cˆi ∨ si) + 1
t
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
N
≤ 1
t∨
∑
t(∨)
Cs(cˆi ∨ si) + 1
t
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
N
=C¯s−t(∨) +
1
t
∑
t(∧)
|ξi|
N
(65)
where (d) is due to Lemma 1. With (ω + t) → ∞ and N → ∞, have t(∧) → ∅, thus Rs(t)
is upper bounded by C¯s−t(∨), which is the average secrecy capacity of matched cases that
C¯s−t(∨) ≥ min Cs(S).
Lemma 2 ( [4], [22]) Considering an arbitrary subset A of index N for DMC W , in case
of A used as the information set and Ac used as frozen set for polar coding, by applying the
successive cancellation decoding, for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ , the block error probability is
bounded by
max
i∈A
1
2
(1−
√
1− Z(W (i)N )2) ≤ Pe(A) ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(W
(i)
N ) (66)
especially when
A ⊆ {i ∈ [[1, N ]] : Z (Ui|U i−11 ) ≤ δN} (67)
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have
Pe(A) ≤
∑
i∈A
Z(Ui|U i−11 , Y N) = O(2−N
β
) (68)
Proposition 3 (Reliability) Let Pe(t) be the error probability of t times secure communication
based on the proposed active secure polar coding scheme. Then when (ω+t)→∞, the reliability
criterion in Definition 6 can be achieved for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ .
Proof:
Pe(t) = Pr{M t1 6= Mˆ t1 or (UE)t2 6= (UˆE)t2}
(e)
=
∑
i∈t(∨)
∑
j∈Eˆi
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N) +
∑
j∈ˆIi∪Rˆi
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N)

+
∑
i∈t(∧)
∑
j∈η′i
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N) +
∑
j∈ηi
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N)

+
∑
i∈t(∧)
∑
j∈η˜′i
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N) +
∑
j∈η˜i
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N)

≤(2t∨ + 2t∧)O(2−Nβ) +
∑
i∈t(∧)
∑
η˜′i+η˜i
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N)
=2tO(2−N
β
) +
∑
i∈t(∧)
∑
η˜′i+η˜i
Z(Uj|U j1 , Y N)
(70)
where (e) is due to Lemma 2. When (ω + t) → ∞, have t(∧) → ∅, thus Pe(t) ≤ 2tO(2−Nβ)
which satisfies the reliability criterion.
Lemma 3 ( [6]) Considering the multi-block chaining structure and the polar subset division
of index N , for k ∈ [[1, t]], let Ek = UEk , Zk = (ZN)k, Ik1 = I(Mk1Ek;Zk1 ), have
Ik1 ≤ Ik−11 + I(MkEk;Zk) (71)
Definition 12 For arbitrary subset A of index N , define q1 < q2 < ... < q|A| be the correspon-
dent indices of the elements UA, and
UA , Uq|A|q1 = Uq1 , Uq1 , ..., Uq|A| (72)
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Lemma 4 ( [9]) Considering the multi-block chaining structure and the polar subset division
of index N , for arbitrary A ⊆ HX|Z , i ∈ [[1, |A|]], qi ∈ A, β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ , have
H(Uqi |Uqi−1q1 , ZN) ≥ H(Uqi |Uqi−11 , ZN)
≥ 1−O(N22−Nβ)
(74)
Proposition 4 (Security) Let L(t) be the information leakage of t times secure communication
based on the proposed active secure polar coding scheme. Then when (ω + t)→∞, the strong
security criterion in Definition 6 can be achieved for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δN = 2−Nβ .
Proof:
L(t) = I(M t1;Z
t
1) ≤ I(M t1Et;Zt1)
(f)
≤
t∑
k=1
I(MkEk;Zk)
=
∑
t(∨)
I(MkEk;Zk) +
∑
t(∧)
I(MkEk;Zk)
(76)
where (f) is due to Lemma 3. For k ∈ t(∨), have
I(MkEk;Zk) = I(U
Iˆk ;ZN)
=
|Iˆk|∑
i=1
I(Uqi ;Z
N |Uqi−1q1 )
(g)
=
|Iˆk|∑
i=1
I(Uqi ;U
qi−1
q1
, ZN)
(h)
=
|Ik|∑
i=1
I(Uqi ;U
qi−1
q1
, ZN)
=
|Ik|∑
i=1
[
H(Uqi)−H(Uqi |Uqi−1q1 , ZN)
]
(i)
≤O(N32−Nβ)
(78)
where (g) is because Uqi are independent from each other, (h) is because Iˆ = I for matched
case, (i) is due to Lemma 4. Thus∑
t(∨)
I(MkEk;Zk) ≤ t∨O(N32−Nβ) (79)
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For k ∈ t(∧), have
I(MkEk;Zk) = I(U
Iˆk ;ZN)
=
|Iˆk|∑
i=1
I(Uqi ;Z
N |Uqi−1q1 )
=
|Iˆk|∑
i=1
I(Uqi ;U
qi−1
q1
, ZN)
(j)
=
|ξ′k|∑
i=1
I(Uqi ;U
qi−1
q1
, ZN) +
|ξ˜k|∑
j=1
I(Uqj ;U
qj−1
q1
, ZN)
(k)
≤O(N32−Nβ) +
|ξ˜k|∑
j=1
I(Uqj ;U
qj−1
q1
, ZN)
(81)
where (j) is due to Definition 11, (k) is due to Lemma 4. Thus∑
t(∧)
I(MkEk;Zk) ≤t∧O(N32−Nβ)
+
∑
t(∧)
|ξ˜k|∑
j=1
I(Uqj ;U
qj−1
q1
, ZN)
(83)
therefore
L(t) ≤ tO(N32−Nβ) +
∑
t(∧)
|ξ˜k|∑
j=1
I(Uqj ;U
qj−1
q1
, ZN) (84)
when (ω + t)→∞, have t(∧)→ ∅, thus L(t) ≤ tO(N32−Nβ), so the strong security criterion
is achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel solution for A-WTC secure communication, called
active secure coding scheme, which combines the method of machine learning to the traditional
physical layer secure coding scheme to provide an active defense against the active eavesdropper,
especially under the unlimited computational power condition.
To build an universal active coding method, we construct an HMM based abstract detectable
A-WTC with the notions of EB state and EB pattern. Based on this abstract model, we apply the
machine learning algorithms to construct a EB pattern learning and EB stated decoding schemes,
which can effectively estimate the optimal EB state from the legitimate parties’ observations.
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Therefore physical layer secure coding can actively responding the eavesdropper according to
the estimated EB state.
Then we perform the active coding method to the GV-WTC and construct an explicit active
secure polar coding scheme. In the scheme, we extends the multi-block chaining structure to adapt
the EB states shifting cases for achieve the strong security for t times secure communication.
As proofed, both the active secure coding scheme for abstract A-WTC and active secure polar
coding scheme for GV-WTC can achieve the average secrecy capacity under the reliability and
strong security criterions.
APPENDIX A
THE BAUM-WELCH ALGORITHM FOR EB PATTERN LEARNING
Considering the HMM model (S,O,A,B, pi) introduced in Section III with unknown EB
pattern time sequence st1 and detected observation time sequence o
t
1. Assume we know the full
set of S and O. Define bi(oj) = p(oj|si) and set random initial conditions to λ = (A,B, pi).
Then the Baum-Welch algorithm [18] for EB pattern learning is as follow.
i. Forward procedure: for i ∈ [[1, α]], k ∈ [[1, t]], denote
µi(k) = p(o
k
1, Sk = si|λ) (85)
initialization
µi(1) = piibi(o1) (86)
recursion
µi(k + 1) = bj(ok+1)
α∑
j=1
µj(k)aji (87)
ii. Backward procedure: for i ∈ [[1, α]], k ∈ [[1, t]], denote
ρi(k) = p(o
k
1|Sk = si, λ) (88)
initialization
ρi(t) = 1 (89)
recursion
ρi(k) =
α∑
j=1
ρj(k + 1)aijbj(ok+1) (90)
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iii. Update: denote υi(k) = p(Sk = si|ok1, λ) and φij(k) = p(Sk = si, Sk+1 = sj|ok1, λ). Then
according to the Bayes theorem, have
υi(k) =
p(Sk = si, o
k
1|λ)
p(ok1|λ)
=
µi(k)ρi(k)∑α
j=1 µj(k)ρj(k)
(91)
φij(k) =
p(Sk = si, Sk+1 = sj, o
k
1|λ)
p(ok1|λ)
=
µi(k)aijρj(k + 1)bj(ok+1)∑α
i=1
∑α
j=1 µi(k)aijρj(k + 1)bj(ok+1)
(93)
Then the parameter set λ of the HMM can be updated by
pi∗i = υi(1) (94)
a∗ij =
∑t−1
k=1 φij(k)∑t−1
k=1 υi(k)
(95)
b∗ij =
∑t
k+1 1ok=ojυi(k)∑t
k+1 υi(k)
(96)
where i ∈ [[1, α]], j ∈ [[1, γ]], k ∈ [[1, t]]
1ok=oj =
1 if ok = oj0 otherwise (97)
APPENDIX B
THE VITERBI ALGORITHM FOR EB STATE DECODING
Following the notation for HMM in Appendix A, assume we know the full set of S and O,
know the parameter set λ and have the observation ot1.
For i ∈ [[1, α]], k ∈ [[1, t]], denote κi(t) as the probability of the most likely path sˆk1 with
sˆt = si that generates the observation ok1, denote τi(k) as the sˆk−1 of the most likely path sˆ
k−1
1
with sˆk = si, have
κi(k) = max
s∈S
p(sˆk1, sˆt = si, o
k
1, λ) (98)
Then the Viterbi algorithm [19] for EB state decoding is as follow.
i. Initialization with
κi(1) = piibi(o1)
τi(1) = 0
(100)
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ii. Recursion for i ∈ [[1, α]], k ∈ [[2, t]]
κi(k) = max
i∈[[1,α]]
[κi(k − 1)aijbj(ok)]
τi(k) = arg max
i∈[[1,α]]
[κi(k − 1)aijbj(ok)]
(102)
iii. End for
p∗ = max
i∈[[1,α]]
κi(t)
s∗t = arg max
i∈[[1,α]]
κi(t)
(104)
vi. Path trace, for k = t− 1, t− 2, ..., 1
s∗k = τs∗k+1(k + 1) (105)
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